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Abstract 
 
Financial constraints have been found to play an important role on various aspects of firm behavior. Yet, their 
effects on firm survival have been largely neglected. We use a panel of 61496 UK firms over the period 1997-
2002 to study the effects of financial variables on firms’ failure probabilities, differentiating firms into 
globally engaged and purely domestic. Estimating a wide range of specifications, we find that lower collateral 
and higher leverage result in higher failure probabilities for purely domestic than for globally engaged firms. 
This can be seen as evidence that global engagement shields firms from financial constraints.  
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2 1. Introduction 
Financial constraints have been found to play an important role in various aspects of firm 
behavior, such as determining their investment in fixed capital, inventories, and R&D (see 
Hubbard, 1998; and Bond and Van Reenen, 2006, for surveys). Most studies in this 
literature have used firm-level data to estimate investment equations augmented with 
financial variables such as cash flow, and interpreted a high sensitivity of investment to 
these variables as a proxy for a high degree of financing constraints faced by firms. A 
financially constrained firm, for which it is difficult or too expensive to obtain external 
finance, will in fact only invest if it has sufficient internal funds, and will invest more (less) 
the higher (lower) its cash flow1. Higher sensitivities were generally found for firms that 
were a priori more likely to face financing constraints, such as small, young firms, and 
firms with low dividend payouts and high levels of indebtedness.  
Yet, surprisingly, the effects of financial constraints on firm survival have been 
largely neglected in the literature: only a handful of papers have included financial 
variables in equations modelling survival probabilities (Bunn and Redwood, 2003; 
Fotopoulos and Louri, 2000; Vartia, 2004; Zingales, 1998)2. Using data from a wide range 
of countries, they found a significant association between financial variables and firms’ 
survival probabilities. Yet, none of these studies exploited firm heterogeneity to better 
understand this link. This paper seeks to fill this gap. Specifically, we analyze for the first 
time the effects of financial variables on firm survival probabilities, differentiating firms 
into globally engaged and purely domestic. We consider two dimensions of global 
engagement. The first is based on whether the firms are foreign owned, and the second on 
whether they export3. Differentiating the effects of financial variables on survival 
probabilities for globally engaged and domestic firms is motivated by a number of recent 
empirical papers, which argue that global engagement may shield firms from financial 
constraints, and consequently improve their performance. Using data for the UK, Guariglia 
and Mateut (2005), for example, find that small, young, and risky firms that are globally 
engaged exhibit lower sensitivities of inventory investment to financial variables than their 
domestic counterparts. This makes them less financially constrained, as they do not have to 
                                                 
1 This view has been challenged by Kaplan and Zingales (1997), Cleary (1999), and Cummins et al. (2006). 
2 Throughout the paper, we use the terms survival and failure interchangeably, keeping in mind that one is the 
flip side of the other. 
3 A number of papers (Bernard and Sjöholm, 2003; Görg and Strobl, 2003) have looked at the direct effects of 
global engagement on firm survival. However, their main focus is on multinationals’ voluntary exit from a 
market, which takes place by shifting production from one country to another in the presence of adverse 
shocks in the host country. Contrary to theirs, our analysis mainly focuses on firms’ death as a consequence of 
failure (involuntary exit). 
3 rely as much on internal funds to finance inventory investment4. Similarly, using data 
from various emerging markets, Desai et al. (2007) document that, contrary to their purely 
domestic counterparts, affiliates of multinational firms are able to expand output after 
severe depreciations when both growth opportunities and financial constraints arise. 
Finally, focusing on Indonesia, Blalock et al. (2004) show that following the 1997 East 
Asian financial crisis which led to a strong currency devaluation, only foreign-owned 
exporters were able to significantly increase their investment. Although the global 
engagement-induced improvements in plant performance documented by these authors are 
likely to translate themselves into increases in their chances of survival, none of these 
studies have explicitly tested whether global engagement affects firm survival, by shielding 
firms from liquidity constraints. This is the objective of this paper.  
The main reasons why global engagement may shield firms from liquidity 
constraints can be summarized as follows. First, globally engaged firms have access to both 
internal and international financial markets, which allows them to diversify their sources of 
financing and the associated risks. In particular, foreign owned firms can access credit 
through their parent company and thus insure themselves against liquidity constraints 
(Desai et al., 2004). Second, foreign owned firms typically enjoy less bankruptcy risk and 
adopt international standards faster in terms of product quality. Consequently, they find it 
easier to gain access to domestic banks (Colombo, 2001; Harrison and McMillan, 2003). 
Third, being dependent on demand from foreign countries, exporting firms are tied less to 
the domestic cycle, and less subject to those financial constraints induced by tight monetary 
policy and recessions at home5. This may lead to a more stable cash flow for exporters 
compared to non-exporters, which in turn is likely to lead to a relaxation of the liquidity 
constraints for the former, as a more stable cash flow provides greater assurances to lenders 
that the firm will be able to service its obligations (Hirsch and Lev, 1971; Campa and 
Shaver, 2002; Garcia-Vega and Guariglia, 2007). Finally, given the presence of sunk costs 
that need to be met when entering foreign markets for the first time (Robets and Tybout, 
1997), being an exporter also provides a signal that the firm is sufficiently productive to 
generate enough profits in foreign markets to recover the sunk costs. This increases the 
likelihood that the firm will be able to service its external debt, and further relaxes the 
liquidity constraints that it faces (Campa and Shaver, 2002).  
                                                 
4 Also see Greenaway et al. (2007), who using the same UK data limited to the manufacturing sector, find that 
exporters typically exhibit better financial health than non-exporters. 
5 This argument relies on the assumption that business cycles are not perfectly coordinated across countries. 
4 If global engagement indeed shields firms from financing constraints, then we 
would expect failure probabilities of globally engaged firms to be less sensitive to financial 
variables than those of purely domestic firms. We test this hypothesis using a panel of 
61496 UK firms over the period 1997-2002. Our choice of the UK is motivated by two 
considerations. First, this country ranks high in terms of global engagement: it is the fifth 
largest exporter of manufacturing goods globally and the second largest host of 
multinational enterprises. Second, to the best of our knowledge, virtually no other study has 
looked at the links between global engagement and firm survival probabilities in the UK.  
We find that when firms are divided according to whether they are globally engaged 
or purely domestic, lower collateral and higher leverage result in higher failure probabilities 
for the latter. This supports our hypothesis that global engagement shields firms from 
liquidity constraints. Our results are robust to estimating Logit and Cox proportional hazard 
models; to controlling for the biases induced by rare event data and for unobserved 
heterogeneity; and to including in our sample only those firms established after 1996 
(newly established firms). For the latter firms, the results are also robust to considering the 
two dimensions of global engagement (exporting and being foreign owned) separately. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present our 
baseline specification. Section 3 describes our data, and provides some descriptive 
statistics. Section 4 presents our main empirical results and a range of robustness tests. 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Baseline specification 
We initially estimate the following Logit model for the probability of firm failure 
)1( =itFAIL on the pooled data set6: 
 
 )'()1Pr( βitit XFFAIL ==        (1) 
 
where Xit’ is a matrix of characteristics of firm i at time t with coefficients β . 
As in Bunn and Redwood (2003), we define a firm as failed (dead) in a given year if 
its company status is that of receivership, liquidation, or dissolved7. Since more than 75 
                                                 
6 Lennox (1999a) and Bernard et al. (2006) also estimated Logit models of firm survival. On the other hand, 
Zingales (1998), Lennox (1999a), Bernard and Jensen (1999, 2007), and Bunn and Redwood (2003) estimated 
Probit models. All our results were robust to using a Probit instead of a Logit in estimation. 
5 percent of our failed firms were either in liquidation or in receivership, we can say that our 
main focus is on firms’ death as a consequence of bankruptcy, not voluntary exit.  
Our Xit’ matrix includes measures of the firm’s age (Ageit), size (Sizeit), and 
profitability (Profitabilityit); a dummy indicating whether the firm is part of a group 
(Groupi); and financial variables (Leverageit and Collateralit) interacted with dummies 
indicating whether the firm is globally engaged (GEit) or purely domestic (1-GEit). Sizeit 
represents the size of firm i at time t, measured in terms of the logarithm of its total real 
assets. Since firms typically enter the market at a small size relative to their minimum 
efficient scale, we expect exit rates to be decreasing in size (Audretsch and Mahmood, 
1995)8. Profitabilityit is measured as the firm’s profit margin, i.e. the ratio of its profits 
before interests and tax to its total assets. It is included as a proxy for the firm’s efficiency 
(Bunn and Redwood, 2003)9. We expect more profitable firms to be less likely to fail. 
Groupi is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is part of a group (UK or foreign), and 0 
otherwise10. It is included, following Disney et al. (2003), and is expected to have a 
negative effect on the probability of firm failure: group firms are likely to have better 
access to capital markets and to respond more quickly to shocks than single firms due to 
better information processing. Leverageit and Collateralit are financial variables proxying 
respectively for the degree of indebtedness of the firm, and its degree of collateralization, 
similar to those used by Fotopoulos and Louri (2000). Specifically, Leverageit represents 
the firm’s short-term debt to assets ratio; and Collateralit, its collateral ratio, given by the 
ratio of the firm’s tangible to total assets11.  
                                                                                                                                                     
7 Liquidation and receivership are two types of reorganization procedures, which can take place when a 
company becomes insolvent. In liquidation, the assets of the company are sold so as to meet the claims of 
creditors. In receivership, the receiver can decide whether it is in the creditors’ interests to sell the company’s 
assets. Generally, it is in the creditors’ interests to liquidate if the liquidation value of the company exceeds its 
going concern value (Lennox, 1999b). As in Bunn and Redwood (2003) and Lennox (1999b), exits by 
takeover are not included in our definition of failure, as takeovers may be regarded as a sign of success rather 
than failure.  
8 We think that current size is a better predictor of a firm’s survival chances than size at start-up because it 
captures a firm’s ability to adapt to a changing competitive environment (Mata and Portugal, 1994). Our 
results were robust to replacing current size with initial size. 
9 Bernard and Jensen (2007) have emphasized the role of productivity on firm survival. We did not include a 
measure of productivity in our estimating Equation due to data problems: information on employment is in 
fact missing for a large number of observations. We are convinced, however, that profitability, which we 
included in all our regressions, is a good proxy for productivity. 
10 A company is said to be part of a group if it is a subsidiary of one or more (UK or foreign) holding 
companies. A drawback of this variable is that it is time-invariant: the information only refers to the latest 
year available for each firm. 
11 Our results were robust to using alternative measures of indebtedness, such as the firm’s total (short- and 
long-term) debt to assets ratio, or its total liabilities to total assets ratio. They were also robust to considering a 
broader measure of collateral given by the firm’s tangible assets plus inventory stock over its total assets. The 
results based on these different financial variables are not reported for brevity, but are available upon request.  
6 Especially for firms a priori more likely to face financing constraints and during 
recessions, being highly leveraged increases moral hazard and adverse selection problems, 
and leads to the inability of firms to obtain external finance at a reasonable cost. High 
leverage is in fact associated with an unhealthy balance sheet. Also considering that 
servicing a high debt may become obstructive for the operation and eventually for the 
existence of firms, we expect highly leveraged firms to be less likely to survive (Fotopoulos 
and Louri, 2000). On the other hand, we expect firms with a high collateral ratio to 
experience lower probabilities of failing. The higher this ratio, the more collateralized and 
committed firms are, and the less likely they are to face financing constraints. Assets that 
are more tangible sustain in fact more external financing because tangibility increases the 
value that can be recaptured by creditors if borrowers default (Carpenter and Petersen, 
2002b; Braun and Larrain, 2005). As in the financing constraints literature, we interpret 
higher sensitivities of firms’ survival probabilities to these financial variables as an 
indicator of a higher level of financing constraints faced by firms: the more financially 
healthy a firm is, the less its leverage and collateral will impact on its probability of failure.  
Given that our objective is to verify whether there is a differential effect of the 
financial variables on the failure probabilities of globally engaged and purely domestic 
firms, we interact our financial variables as follows: Leverageit*[1-GEit]; 
Leverageit*[GEit]; Collateralit*[1-GEit]; and Collateralit*[GEit], where GEit is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the firm is globally engaged, and 0 otherwise. This exercise is 
motivated by Guariglia and Mateut (2005), Desai et al. (2007), and Blalock et al. (2004), 
according to which global engagement improves firms’ performance by shielding them 
from financial constraints. If this hypothesis were true, financial variables should have a 
weaker effect on globally engaged firms’ probabilities of failure, compared to domestic 
firms’: the coefficients and marginal effects associated with Leverageit*[1-GEit] and 
Collateralit*[1-GEit] should be larger than those associated with Leverageit*[GEit] and 
Collateralit*[GEit]12.  
Our Xit’ matrix also includes a full set of industry dummies, as well as a full set of 
time dummies to control for business cycle effects13. Since the average length of time 
                                                 
12 Instead of using interaction terms, we could estimate our Logit Equation separately for globally engaged 
and purely domestic firms. Our chosen approach is preferable as it allows us to gain degrees of freedom and 
to take into consideration the fact that firms can transit between the globally engaged and purely domestic 
states. All our results were robust to estimating separate regressions for globally engaged and purely domestic 
firms. These results are not reported for brevity, but are available upon request. 
13 Our full set of industry dummies is made up of 24 dummies, which are described in the Appendix. Only 23 
of these dummies were included in our regressions. Our results were robust to replacing the industry dummies 
7 between the final annual report of a failing company and its entry into bankruptcy is 
usually 14 months (Lennox, 1999a), our regressors are evaluated at time t. Yet, all our 
results were robust to using lagged regressors. 
 
3. Main features of the data and summary statistics 
 
3.1 The dataset 
We construct our dataset from the profit and loss and balance sheet data gathered by the 
Bureau Van Dijk in the Financial Analysis Made Easy (FAME) database14. More than 99 
percent of the firms included in this dataset are not traded on the stock market, or are 
quoted on other exchanges such as the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) and the Off-
Exchange (OFEX) market. Unquoted firms are more likely to be characterized by adverse 
financial attributes such as a short track record, poor solvency, and low real assets 
compared to quoted firms, which are typically large, financially healthy, long-established 
companies with good credit ratings. 
Our dataset provides information on companies over the period 1997-2002. The 
firms in our dataset operate in the entire economy15. We excluded companies that changed 
the date of their accounting year-end by more than a few weeks, so that the data refers to 
twelve month accounting periods. Firms that did not have complete records on assets, 
profitability, and the financial and global engagement variables that we included in our 
regressions were also dropped. Finally, to control for the potential influence of outliers, we 
excluded observations in the one percent tails for each of the regression variables. Our 
panel therefore comprises of a total of 253151 annual observations (firm-years) on 61496 
                                                                                                                                                     
with industry-specific variables commonly used in the firm survival literature, such as the investment rate, the 
employment growth rate, the median firm size (to proxy for the minimum efficient scale of the industry), and 
a Herfindahl index measured in terms of firms’ employment shares (to proxy for the level of competition in 
the industry). Our results were also robust to using a more disaggregated set of 56 industry dummies, 
reflecting the two-digit UK SIC codes.  
14 We only selected firms that have unconsolidated accounts: this ensures that the majority of the firms in our 
dataset are relatively small. Moreover, it avoids the double counting of firms belonging to groups, which 
would be included in the dataset if firms with consolidated accounts were also part of it. It has to be noted that 
UK accounting regulations have reporting exemptions for some variables for the smaller firms. Although our 
analysis is confined to the sub-sample which reports the required information, we believe that a sufficiently 
large portion of the economy is covered by our dataset. Also see Bunn and Redwood (2003) who used the 
FAME dataset to study business failures in the UK. 
15 A number of studies that looked at the effects of financing constraints on firm behavior excluded from their 
analysis financial, insurance, real estate, and public administration companies (Cleary, 1999; Bunn and 
Redwood, 2003; Cleary et al., 2004). All our results were robust to excluding these companies from our 
sample. These results based on the restricted sample are not reported for brevity, but are available upon 
request. 
8 companies, covering the years 1997-2002. It has an unbalanced structure, with the number 
of years of observations on each firm varying between 1 and 616.  
Following Mata et al. (1995), Audretsch and Mahmood (1995), Fotopoulos and 
Louri (2000), Bernard and Sjöholm (2003), and Disney et al. (2003), we subsequently limit 
our analysis to newly established firms, that is to all cohorts of firms established between 
1996 and 2002. The rationale for this is that, otherwise, of those firms born before 1996, 
only those that survived long enough to still be alive in 1996 would be observed, leading to 
a sample selection bias. Our shorter panel comprises of a total of 27900 annual 
observations (firm-years) on 9420 companies, covering the years 1997-2002.  
 
3.2 Summary statistics 
Table 1 refers to the full sample and presents means and standard deviations of the main 
variables likely to influence company failure, for all firm-years in our sample (column 1), 
for surviving firm-years and failed firm-years (columns 2 and 3), and for globally engaged 
and purely domestic firm-years (columns 4 and 5)17. Table 2 presents similar information 
for the sample of newly established firms. Focusing on Table 1, we can see that out of our 
253151 firm-years, 4475 (1.77 percent) were recorded as failed. This figure is consistent 
with Bunn and Redwood (2003) and Lennox (1999a). Furthermore, without holding other 
factors constant, surviving firm-years are generally larger than failed firm-years, where size 
is measured in terms of total real assets. Surviving firm-years are also older and more likely 
to be part of a group (UK or foreign). Coming to global engagement, surviving firm-years 
are more likely to be globally engaged than their failed counterparts (35 percent of the 
surviving firm-years are globally engaged compared to 28 percent of their domestic 
counterparts). Yet, because the probability of exporting is similar across the two groups 
(37-38 percent), it is the foreign ownership dimension of global engagement that seems to 
drive this result (24 percent of the surviving firm-years are foreign owned, versus 10 
percent of their domestic counterparts). Regarding the financial variables, failed firm-years 
display lower collateral ratios (0.25) and higher leverage ratios (0.31) than surviving firm-
years (for which the ratios are respectively 0.30 and 0.25).  
When firm-years are differentiated across globally engaged and purely domestic 
firms (columns 4 and 5), we can see that the former are larger, more likely to be part of a 
                                                 
16 See the Appendix for more information on the structure of our panel and complete definitions of all 
variables used. 
17 The variance-covariance matrix of the main variables used in estimation is presented in Table A1 in the 
Appendix. 
9 group, and less likely to fail than their domestic counterparts. Both types of firm-years 
display similar levels of collateral (22-24 percent), and leverage (31-33 percent).  
A similar broad picture emerges if we limit ourselves to the sample of newly 
established firms (Table 2). Surprisingly, however, in this smaller sample, we observe that 
surviving firm-years are slightly younger than failed ones. Moreover, compared to their 
domestic counterparts, globally engaged firm-years display lower levels of collateral (0.24 
versus 0.33) and higher levels of debt (0.43 versus 0.31). Considering that they are larger, 
and characterized by a lower incidence of death (1.2 percent) than their domestic 
counterparts (1.8 percent), their high leverage and low collateral could stem from their 
ability to borrow much, without the need to post high collateral.  
In the next Section, we will analyze the link between financial variables and failure 
probabilities, conditional on other firm characteristics. A stronger link will be interpreted as 
evidence of stronger financing constraints.  
 
4. Empirical results 
 
4.1 Main empirical results 
Our empirical results are reported in Table 3 (for the full sample) and Table 4 (for the sub-
sample of newly established firms). Column 1 of both Tables sets out the results of 
estimating Equation (1) using a pooled Logit specification18. The results suggest that for the 
full sample, there is a negative and significant association between firms’ age and their 
probability of failure, while for newly established firms, the association is positive. A 
number of theoretical papers (e.g. Jovanovic, 1982; Hopehayn, 1992) have devised models 
of company failure, and argued that the hazard of exit should fall with age as firms use their 
experience of market signals to learn about their own (previously unknown) productivity. 
In line with these models, a number of empirical papers have generally found that younger 
firms are more likely to fail (e.g. Audretsch and Mahmood, 1995; Mata and Portugal, 1994; 
Disney at al., 2003). Our different finding for the sample of newly established firms is 
likely to be driven by the small size of the sample19. Furthermore, as expected, for both our 
samples, larger firms and firms that are part of a group are less likely to die. In line with 
                                                 
18 The standard errors are adjusted to allow for clustering for each individual company. We also estimated a 
more general version of our Equation, which contained the global engagement dummy in addition to its 
interactions with the financial variables. Because the dummy generally attracted a poorly determined 
coefficient, we excluded it in the reported specifications. The inclusion of the dummy did not alter any of the 
results. 
19 Adding a quadratic term in age resulted in a poorly determined coefficient and did not alter this finding. 
10
 Bunn and Redwood (2003), when the full sample is considered, the profit margin displays 
a negative and significant association with the probability of failure. Yet, when only newly 
established firms are considered, this variable appears to have little or no impact on 
survivorship. Once again, this result is likely to be driven by the small size of the sample. 
Coming to the financial variables, we can see that, in the full sample, they play a 
statistically significant effect both on the domestic and globally engaged firms’ failure 
probabilities (Table 3). Yet, the effects are always larger (in absolute value) for the former. 
The marginal effects (not reported for brevity) suggest that increasing the leverage ratio by 
one standard deviation, would raise the probability of failure of a domestic firm by 0.18 
percentage points, and that of a globally engaged firm, by 0.10 percentage points. Similarly, 
raising the collateral ratio by one standard deviation would reduce a domestic firm’s 
probability of failure by 0.28 percentage points, while the corresponding probability of a 
globally engaged firm would only be reduced by 0.17 percentage points20.  
For the sample of newly established firms (Table 4), the financial variables only 
affect domestic firms’ chances of survival: increasing these firms’ leverage ratio by one 
standard deviation, would raise their probability of failure by 0.12 percentage points, while 
raising their collateral ratio by one standard deviation would reduce their probability of 
failure by 0.36 percentage points. These findings support our hypothesis that global 
engagement affects UK firms’ survival probabilities by making them less vulnerable to 
financial constraints. It is in line with Guariglia and Mateut (2005) who, using the FAME 
dataset limited to the manufacturing sector, measured liquidity constraints as the sensitivity 
of firms’ inventory investment to financial variables, and found that only the inventory 
investment of those small, young, and risky firms, which are purely domestic responds to 
changes in financial variables. Thus, although newly established globally engaged firms 
display higher leverage and lower collateral than their domestic counterparts, these 
attributes do not seem to affect their failure probabilities. In the case of foreign owned 
firms, this could be due to the fact that even if they display high debt and/or low collateral, 
these firms can always obtain funds from their parent company, which increases their 
probability of survival. In the case of exporters, it could be due to the signalling effect that 
having paid the sunk export market entry costs, these firms must be sufficiently productive 
to generate enough profits in foreign markets to recover the sunk costs. This signalling 
                                                 
20 The p-value associated with a χ2 test aimed at testing the hypothesis of whether the coefficients associated 
with leverage (collateral) are equal at foreign and domestic firms is 0.0016 (0.00), suggesting that the 
hypothesis can be rejected. 
11
 effect is likely to attenuate the adverse effects of high levels of debt and/or low levels of 
collateral, therefore increasing these firms’ chances of survival.  
 In all regressions, the coefficients associated with the time and industry dummies 
(not reported in the Table) are generally significant, indicating that business cycle and 
industry-specific effects matter21. 
 
4.2 Robustness tests 
We now check whether our results are robust to using a Cox proportional hazard model and 
a rare-events Logit model in estimation; to controlling for unobserved heterogeneity; to 
including time dummies interacted with industry dummies; and to considering the two 
dimensions of global engagement (exporting and being foreign owned) separately. 
 
Cox proportional hazard specification 
Estimating the hazard of exit using a Cox proportional hazard specification complements 
the Logit specification as it models both the event of failure and the time it takes a firm to 
fail. Specifically, we estimate the determinants of the hazard of firm failure, λi(t), which 
represents the instantaneous rate at which firm i fails at time t given that it was ‘alive’ at 
time t-1 using a proportional hazard model of the form: 
 
λi(t) = λ0(t)exp(X’itβ)         (2) 
 
where λ0(t) is the baseline hazard, and Xit’ is a matrix of explanatory variables with 
coefficients β, similar to those used in the Logit specification. Since we are not interested in 
investigating the underlying shape of the baseline hazard, but in understanding the effect 
financial and global engagement variables have on the firm’s hazard of exit, Cox’s (1972) 
partial likelihood approach provides a convenient way of estimating the parameters β 
                                                 
21 We also attempted a Logit specification, in which we included the leverage ratio, our measure of collateral, 
and the global engagement dummy as separate regressors. We found that the leverage ratio attracted a positive 
and strongly significant coefficient (0.222; standard error: 0.096), while collateral attracted a negative and 
precisely determined coefficient (-1.021; standard error: 0.232). The coefficient associated with the global 
engagement dummy, on the other hand, was poorly determined (0.045; standard error: 0.136), suggesting that 
global engagement does not directly affect firms’ survival probabilities. These results are not reported for 
brevity, but are available upon request. 
12
 without having to specify a functional form for the baseline hazard, λ0(t). This estimation 
method has been widely used in the literature on firm survival22. 
In both Tables 3 and 4, column 2 reports the estimates of Equation (2)23. It should 
be noted that, in this case, age could not be entered in the model directly, as it is collinear 
with the baseline hazard. We have therefore replaced it with cohort dummies. The 
coefficients on the latter (not reported for brevity) were, however, poorly determined. 
Regarding the other explanatory variables, the results are consistent with those reported in 
the Logit specification in column 1 of both Tables. In particular, for both samples, we 
observe a strong negative relationship between collateral and the exit hazard for domestic 
firms, and a strong positive relationship between the leverage ratio and their exit hazard. A 
higher collateral and a lower leverage ratio are therefore associated with a longer survival 
time for domestic firms. In the full sample (Table 3), the financial variables also 
significantly affect the survival rates of the globally engaged firms, but their effects are 
always smaller (in absolute value) than the corresponding effects for domestic firms. In 
contrast, in the sample of newly established firms, globally engaged firms’ survival times 
are not affected by financial variables (Table 4).  
 
Correcting for the biases induced by rare events 
Since the rate of firm failure in our analysis is small (1.77 percent in the full sample, and 
1.55 percent in the sample made up of newly established firms), it could potentially be 
classified as a rare event. One consequence of this is that our Logit regression may 
underestimate the probability of this rare event. We check whether our results are robust to 
correcting for this bias, using the procedures suggested in King and Zeng (2001a, 2001b) 
for generating approximately unbiased and lower-variance estimates of Logit coefficients 
and their variance-covariance matrix correcting for rare events. Our corrected results, 
reported in column 3 of Tables 3 and 4, are similar to those outlined for the Logit 
specification in column 124. This suggests that having a small rate of firm failure is not a 
significant source of bias. 
 
                                                 
22 See for instance Mata et al. (1995); Audretsch and Mahmood (1995); Fotopolous and Louri (2000); Bernard 
and Sjöholm (2003); Disney et al. (2003); and Vartia (2004). 
23 In Tables 3 and 4, the slightly smaller number of observations in column 2 compared to column 1 is due to 
the fact that the Cox proportional hazard model controls for ties, i.e. for observations with identical duration. 
Also note that the estimates reported in column 2 of Table 3 are likely to suffer from the sample selection bias 
due to the fact that those firms born and dissolved before the start of the sample are excluded. 
24 These results were obtained using the relogit command in Stata. 
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 Correcting for unobserved heterogeneity 
Although all the models we have estimated so far include firm-specific covariates, it is 
unlikely that they can account for all observation-specific effects. Not taking proper 
account of unobserved heterogeneity may bias the results and lead to misleading inferences 
being made about the effect the explanatory variables have on the likelihood of failure. 
Column 4 of Tables 3 and 4 presents the results of a random-effects Logit model, which 
controls for unobserved effects25. We can see that the signs and significance of the 
coefficients associated with the main variables included in our regression do not change 
once unobserved heterogeneity is taken into account. Specifically, both our financial 
variables only affect the survival probabilities of the domestic firms in the sample made up 
of newly established firms. On the other hand, in the full sample, they affect the survival 
probabilities of both domestic and globally engaged firms, the effects for the former being 
always larger.  
 
Including time dummies interacted with industry dummies 
Since there could be shifts in expectations, which could affect firms’ survival probabilities, 
and could be due to changes in industry-level conditions, such as industry demand shocks, 
or industry-wide technology changes (Carpenter and Petersen, 2002), in addition to the 
standard time dummies defined at the aggregate level, which remove cyclical variation 
common to the entire economy, we check whether our results are robust to including time 
dummies interacted with industry dummies. These dummies are aimed at controlling for 
those industry-specific shifts in expectations. The results are reported in column 5 of Tables 
3 and 4. Once again, we can see that the signs and significance of the coefficients 
associated with the main variables included in our regression do not change. 
 
 
 
                                                 
25 The random-effects Logit model requires that firm-specific unobserved effects are uncorrelated with the 
regressors, which might not be a plausible assumption in our context. Alternatively, one could use a 
conditional fixed effects Logit model (Chamberlain, 1980). An advantage of this method of estimation is that 
it allows the regressors and the firm-specific component of the error term to be correlated. However, a 
contribution to the likelihood only arises from those groups of firms that exhibit a change in status (here, from 
alive to dead), and the group of firms that exhibit no change in status are discarded. In our case, this would 
mean a significant loss of observations, and require belief that all the information needed for estimation is 
contained in the remaining data. Other disadvantages of the conditional Logit estimator are that only the time-
varying variables are included, and so the precision of those variables with negligible variance across time 
would be compromised. 
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 Considering the two dimensions of global engagement separately 
In our analysis so far, we have considered a firm as being globally engaged if it exports 
and/or is foreign owned: the two dimensions of global engagement were considered jointly. 
Motivated by our finding in Tables 1 and 2, according to which the higher proportion of 
globally engaged firms found among the surviving group seems to be driven by the foreign 
owned dimension of global engagement, we now question whether our results also hold for 
each of the two dimensions individually. Column 6 of Tables 2 and 3 reports the pooled 
Logit estimates, where EXPORTit (a dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i exports at time t, 
and 0 otherwise) is used as our measure of global engagement. Specifically, the following 
interaction terms are included: Leverageit*[1-EXPORTit]; Leverageit*[EXPORTit]; 
Collateralit*[1-EXPORTit]; Collateralit*[EXPORTit]. In column 7, the dummy FOREIGNi 
(equal to 1 if firm i is foreign-owned, and 0 otherwise) is used26, and the following 
interaction terms are included: Leverageit*[1-FOREIGNi]; Leverageit*[FOREIGNi]; 
Collateralit*[1-FOREIGNi]; Collateralit*[FOREIGNi]. 
Interestingly, in column 6 of Table 4, which refers to the newly established firms, 
our measure of size no longer attracts a statistically significant coefficient. However, our 
profitability measure does. These findings could arise because EXPORTit has a large 
number of missing values, making the sample size much smaller in column 6 compared to 
the other columns. In both columns 6 and 7 of Table 4, it is evident that financial variables 
only affect the survival probabilities of the domestic firms. Thus, for newly established 
firms, our main result that global engagement shields firms from liquidity constraints also 
holds separately for the two dimensions of global engagement that we have considered27.  
The results are weaker for the full sample. Columns 6 of Table 3 shows in fact that 
when global engagement is measured in terms of participation to export markets, both 
financial variables exert an effect of similar magnitude at globally engaged and purely 
domestic firms28. When global engagement is measured in terms of foreign ownership, on 
the other hand, leverage only affects domestic firms, while collateral affects both (column 7 
of Table 3). Although the coefficient on collateral is higher in absolute value for the foreign 
                                                 
26 Note that, like Groupi, FOREIGNi is time-invariant. 
27 We also estimated specifications including EXPORTit / FOREIGNi as separate regressors, in addition to the 
interaction terms. The global engagement dummies always attracted poorly determined coefficients. 
Furthermore, in order to determine whether the lack of time dimension in the FOREIGNi variable biases the 
results, we have estimated our Equation in which FOREIGNi is used as our global engagement measure, 
based on the last year available for each firm: our main results were unchanged. These estimates are not 
reported for brevity, but are available upon request. 
28 The p-value associated with a χ2 test aimed at assessing whether the impact of collateral is equal at foreign 
and domestic firms is in fact 0.409. The corresponding p-value for leverage is 0.645. 
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 owned firms (-0.94) compared to the domestic ones (-0.69), the difference between the 
two coefficients is not statistically significant29. 
 
5. Conclusions 
We have used a panel of newly established UK firms over the period 1997-2002 to study 
the effects of financial variables on survival probabilities, differentiating firms into globally 
engaged and purely domestic. Specifically, we have estimated a Logit model for the 
probability of firm failure augmented with financial variables, which were interacted with 
dummies indicating whether firms are globally engaged or purely domestic. We performed 
our estimations separately on our full sample of firms, and on a sub-sample made up of 
newly established firms only. We found that, for domestic firms, lower collateral and 
higher leverage always result in higher failure probabilities, while financial variables either 
do not significantly affect the survival probabilities of globally engaged firms, or exert a 
smaller impact on them. These results were robust to using a Cox proportional hazard 
model; to controlling for the potential biases induced by rare events and unobserved 
heterogeneity; and to including time dummies interacted with industry dummies. For newly 
established firms, they were also robust to considering the two dimensions of global 
engagement (exporting and being foreign owned) separately. We can conclude that, in the 
UK, global engagement affects firms’ survival probabilities by shielding them from 
financial constraints. These findings may have policy relevance. They suggests that export 
promotion policies and policies providing incentives to Foreign Direct Investment could be 
helpful, reducing the level of financial constraints faced by firms, and indirectly enhancing 
their survival probabilities. 
                                                 
29 The p-value associated with a χ2 test aimed at assessing whether the impact of collateral is equal at foreign 
and domestic firms is in fact 0.210. 
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Appendix: Data 
 
Structure of the unbalanced panel: full sample 
 
 
Number of 
observations 
per firm 
 
Number 
of firms 
 
Percent 
1 7306 2.89 
2 15954 6.30 
3 23682 9.35 
4 29748 11.75 
5 44155 17.44 
6 132306 52.26 
Total 253151 100.00 
 
Structure of the unbalanced panel: newly established firms  
 
 
Number of 
observations 
per firm 
 
Number 
of firms 
 
Percent 
1 1797 6.44 
2 4436 15.90 
3 6627 23.55 
4 6228 22.32 
5 5110 18.32 
6 3702 13.27 
Total 27900 100.00 
 
Table A1 presents the variance-covariance matrix of the main variables used in our 
regressions. Table A2 presents descriptive statistics relative to this longer data sample. 
 
Definitions of the variables used 
Total assets: sum of the firm’s fixed (tangible and intangible) assets and current assets. 
Current assets are defined as the sum of stocks, work-in-progress inventories, trade and 
other debtors, cash and equivalents, and other current assets. 
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 Group: dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is part of a group, and 0 otherwise. A 
company is said to be part of a group if it is a subsidiary of one or more holding companies 
(UK or foreign)30. 
Profitability: ratio of the firm’s profits before interest and tax to its total assets. 
Leverage: firm’s short-term debt to total assets ratio. Short-term debt includes the 
following items: bank overdrafts, short-term group and director loans, hire purchase, 
leasing, and other short-term loans, but it is predominantly bank finance. 
Collateral: ratio of the firm’s tangible assets to its total assets. 
EXPORT: dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm exports a positive amount. 
FOREIGN: dummy equal to 1 if the firm is foreign owned, and 0 otherwise. To be 
considered as foreign owned, the share of foreign ownership in a firm’s equity must exceed 
24.99 percent. Actual data on the share of foreign ownership in a firm’s equity are only 
available for a very limited number of observations. 
GE: dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is globally engaged, and 0 otherwise. A firm is 
considered as globally engaged in a given year if it exports and/or is foreign owned. 
Deflators: all variables are deflated using the aggregate GDP deflator. 
 
Details about our 24 industry dummies 
IND1: Manufacture of basic metals; manufacture of fabricated metal products, except 
machinery and equipment (SIC 27; 28). 
IND2: Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel (SIC 23). 
IND3: Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products; manufacture of rubber and plastic 
products (SIC 24; 25). 
IND4: Manufacture of machinery and equipment not elsewhere classified (SIC 29). 
IND5: Manufacture of office machinery and computers; manufacture of electrical 
machinery and apparatus not elsewhere classified; manufacture of radio, television, and 
communication equipment and apparatus; manufacture of medical, precision, and optical 
instruments, watches, and clocks (SIC 30, 31, 32, 33). 
IND6: Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers, and semi-trailers; manufacture of other 
transport equipment (SIC 34; 35). 
                                                 
30 Information about whether a firm is part of a group or is foreign owned are only provided in the last year of 
observations available for each firm. We therefore assume that a firm which was part of a group or foreign 
owned in its last available year was part of a group or foreign owned throughout the period in which it was 
observed. Given the short sample that we analyze, this is a reasonable assumption. 
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 IND7: Manufacture of food products and beverages; manufacture of tobacco products 
(SIC 15; 16). 
IND8: Manufacture of textiles; manufacture of wearing apparel, dressing, and dying of fur; 
tanning and dressing of leather, manufacture of luggage, handbags, saddlery, harness, and 
footwear (SIC 17; 18; 19). 
IND9: Manufacture of wood and products of wood and cork, except furniture, manufacture 
of articles of straw and plaiting materials; manufacture of pulp, paper, and paper products, 
publishing and printing; publishing, printing, and reproduction of recorded media; 
manufacture of furniture, manufacture not elsewhere specified (SIC 20; 21; 22; 36). 
IND10: Construction (SIC 45). 
IND11: Land transport, transport via pipelines; water transport; air transport; supporting 
and auxiliary transport activities, activities of travel agencies (SIC 60; 61; 62; 63). 
IND12: Post and telecommunications (SIC 64). 
IND13: Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles, retail sale of 
automotive fuel; retail trade except of motor vehicles and motorcycles, repair of personal 
and household goods (SIC 50; 52). 
IND14: Mining of coal and lignite, extraction of peat; extraction of crude petroleum and 
natural gas, service activities incidental to oil and gas extraction excluding surveying; 
mining of uranium and thorium ores; mining of metal ores; other mining and quarrying 
(SIC 10; 11; 12; 13; 14). 
IND15: Agriculture, hunting and related service activities; forestry, logging and related 
service activities; fishing, operation of fish hatcheries and fish farms, service activities 
incidental to fishing (SIC 01; 02; 05). 
IND16: Hotels and restaurants, (SIC 55). 
IND17: Wholesale trade and commission trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles 
(SIC 51). 
IND18: Financial intermediation, except insurance and pension funding; insurance and 
pension funding, except compulsory social security; activities auxiliary to financial 
intermediation (SIC 65; 66; 67). 
IND19: Real estate activities; renting of machinery and equipment without operator and of 
personal and household goods (SIC 70; 71). 
IND20: Computer and related activities; research and development (SIC 72; 73). 
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 IND21: Public administration and defence, compulsory social security; education; health 
and social work; sewage and refuse disposal, sanitation and similar activities; activities of 
membership organisations not elsewhere classified (SIC 75; 80; 85; 90; 91). 
IND22: Recreational and sporting activities (SIC 92). 
IND23: Other business activities (SIC 74). 
IND24: Recycling; electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply; collection, purification, 
and distribution of water; other service activities; private households with employed 
persons (SIC 37; 40; 41; 93; 95). 
 
References 
Audretsch, D. and T. Mahmood (1995). “New Firm Survival: New Results Using a Hazard 
Function.” Review of Economics and Statistics, 77, 97–103. 
Bernard, A. and J. Jensen (1999). “Exceptional Exporters Performance: Cause, Effect or 
Both?” Journal of International Economics, 47, 1-25. 
Bernard, A. and J. Jensen (2007). “Firm Structure, Multinationals, and Manufacturing Plant 
Deaths.” Review of Economics and Statistics, 89, 193-204. 
Bernard, A., J. Jensen, and P. Schott (2006). “Survival of the Best Fit: Exposure to Low-
Wage Countries and the (Uneven) Growth of U.S. Manufacturing Plants.” Journal 
of International Economics, 68, 219-37. 
Bernard, A. B., and F. Sjöholm (2003). “Foreign Owners and Plant Survival.” National 
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 10039. 
Blalock, G, Gertler, P., and D. Levine (2004). “Investment Following a Financial Crisis: 
Does Foreign Ownership Matter?” Mimeograph, Cornell University. 
Bond, S. and J. Van Reenen (2006). “Microeconometric Models of Investment and 
Employment.” forthcoming in J. Heckman and E. Leamer (eds) Handbook of 
Econometrics, Volume 6, Elsevier, North Holland. 
Braun, M. and B. Larrain (2005). “Finance and the Business Cycle: International, Inter-
Industry Evidence.” Journal of Finance, 60, 1097-1128. 
Bunn, P. and V. Redwood (2003). “Company Accounts Based Modelling of Business 
Failures and the Implications for Financial Stability.” Bank of England Discussion 
Paper No. 210. 
Campa J-M. and J-M. Shaver (2002). “Exporting and Capital Investment: On the Strategic 
Behavior of Exporters”. IESE Business School, University of Navarra, Discussion 
Paper No. 469. 
20
 Carpenter, R. and B. Petersen (2002a). “Is the Growth of Small Firms Constrained by 
Internal Finance?” Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 84 (2), 298-309. 
Carpenter, R. and B. Petersen (2002b). “Capital Market Imperfections, High-Tech 
Investment, and New Equity Financing.” Economic Journal, 112, F54-F72. 
Chamberlain, G. (1980). “Analysis of Covariance with Qualitative Data.” Review of 
Economic Studies, 47, 225-238. 
Cleary, S., Povel, P., and M. Raith (2004). “The U-Shaped Investment Curve: Theory and 
Evidence.’ Centre for Economic Policy Research, Discussion Paper No. 4206. 
(forthcoming in the Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis). 
Cleary, S. (1999). “The Relationship between Firm Investment and Financial Status.” 
Journal of Finance, 54, 673-92. 
Colombo, E. (2001). “Determinants of Corporate Capital Structure: Evidence from 
Hungarian Firms.” Applied Economics, 33, 1689-1701. 
Cox, D. (1972). “Regression Models and Life Tables.” Journal of the Royal Statistical 
Society, Series B (Methodological), 34, 187-220. 
Cummins, J., K. Hasset, and S. Oliner (2006). “Investment Behavior, Observable 
Expectations, and Internal Funds.” American Economic Review, 96, 3, 796-810. 
Desai, M., Foley, F., and Forbes, K. (2007). “Financial Constraints and Growth: 
Multinational and Local Firm Responses to Currency Crises.” Review of Financial 
Studies (forthcoming).  
Desai, M., Foley, F., and J. Hines (2004). “A Multinational Perspective on Capital 
Structure Choice and Internal Capital Markets.” Journal of Finance, 59, 2451-87. 
Disney, R., Haskel, J., and Y. Heden (2003). “Entry, Exit and Establishment Survival in 
UK Manufacturing.” Journal of Industrial Economics, 51, 91–112. 
Fotopoulos, G. and H. Louri (2000), “Determinants of Hazard Confronting New Entry: 
Does Financial Structure Matter?” Review of Industrial Organization, 17, pp. 285-
300. 
Garcia-Vega, M. and A. Guariglia (2007). “Volatility, Financial Constraints, and Trade.” 
Mimeograph, University of Nottingham. 
Görg, H., and E. Strobl (2003). “Footlose Multinationals?” The Manchester School, 71, 1–
19. 
Greenaway, D., Guariglia, A. and R. Kneller (2007). “Financial Factors and Exporting 
Decisions.” Journal of International Economics, (forthcoming). 
21
 Guariglia, A. and S. Mateut (2005). “Inventory Investment, Global Engagement and 
Financial Constraints in the UK: Evidence from Micro Data.” GEP Research Paper 
05/23, Leverhulme Centre for Research on Globalization and Economic Policy, 
University of Nottingham. 
Harrison, A. and M. McMillan (2003). “Does Direct Foreign Investment Affect Domestic 
Firms’ Credit Constraints?” Journal of International Economics, 61, 73-100. 
Hirsch, S. and B. Lev (1971). “Sales Stabilization through Export Diversification. Review 
of Economics and Statistics, 53, 270-77. 
Hopenhayn, H. (1992). “Entry, Exit, and Firm Dynamics in Long Run Equilibrium.” 
Econometrica, 60, 1127-50. 
Hubbard, G. (1998). “Capital Market Imperfections and Investment.” Journal of Economic 
Literature, 35, 193-225. 
Jovanovic, B. (1982). “Selection and the Evolution of Industry.” Econometrica, 50, 649-
670. 
Kaplan, S. and L. Zingales (1997). “Do Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities Provide Useful 
Measures of Financing Constraints?” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112, 169-
215. 
King, G. and L. Zeng (2001a). “Explaining Rare Events in International Relations.” 
International Organization, 55, 693-715. 
King, G. and L. Zeng (2001b). “Logistic Regression in Rare Events Data.” Political 
Analysis, 9, 137-63. 
Lennox, C (1999a). “Identifying Failing Companies: a Re-Evaluation of the Logit, Probit 
and DA Approaches.” Journal of Economics and Business, 51, 347-64. 
Lennox, C. (1999b). “Are Large Auditors More Careful than Small Auditors?” Accounting 
and Business Research, 29, 217-27. 
Mata, J., and P. Portugal (1994). “Life Duration of New Firms.” Journal of Industrial 
Economics, 42, 227–246. 
Mata, J., P. Portugal, and P. Guimaraes (1995). “The Survival of New Plants: Start-Up 
Conditions and Post-Entry Evolution.” International Journal of Industrial 
Organization, 13, 459–481. 
Roberts, M. and J. Tybout (1997). “The Decision to Export in Colombia: An Empirical 
Model of Entry with Sunk Costs.” American Economic Review, 87, 545–64. 
Vartia, L. (2004). “Assessing Plant Entry and Exit Dynamics and Survival – Does Firms’ 
Financial Status Matter?” Mimeograph, European University Institute. 
22
 Zingales, L. (1998). “Survival of the Fittest or the Fattest? Exit and Financing in Trucking 
Industry.” Journal of Finance, 53, 905-938. 
23
  
Table 1. Summary statistics: full sample 
 
  
Total sample 
 
 
 
(1) 
 
 
Surviving  
firm-years 
 
 
(2) 
 
 
Failed 
firm-years 
 
 
(3) 
 
Globally 
engaged 
firm-years 
 
(4) 
 
Purely 
domestic 
firm-years 
 
(5) 
 
      
FAILit 0.018 0.00 1.00 0.013 0.020 
 (0.132) (0.00) (0.00) (0.12) (0.14) 
      
Ageit 21.382 21.442 17.696 21.671 21.226 
 (20.41) (20.46) (17.08) (21.19) (19.97) 
Groupi 0.613 0.619 0.347 0.877 0.472 
 (0.49) (0.48) (0.48) (0.33) (0.50) 
Real assetsit 242.542 245.294 89.653 364.331 176.686 
 (1091.79) (1099.23) (511.47) (1322.88) (936.97) 
Log of real assetsit 3.768 3.778 3.213 4.292 3.484 
 (1.55) (1.55) (1.26) (1.57) (1.46) 
Profitabilityit 0.074 0.075 -0.001 0.053 0.086 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.29) (0.22) (0.19) 
      
Leverageit 0.252 0.250 0.310 0.309 0.334 
 (0.32) (0.32) (0.38) (0.36) (0.30) 
Collateralit 0.300 0.301 0.249 0.236 0.220 
 (0.29) (0.28) (0.24) (0.24) (0.29) 
      
GEit 0.351 0.352 0.276 1.00 0.00 
 (0.48) (0.48) (0.45) (0.00) (0.00) 
EXPORTit 0.378 0.378 0.370 0.761 0.00 
 (0.48) (0.48) (0.48) (0.43) (0.00) 
FOREIGNi 0.234 0.236 0.102 0.760 0.00 
 (0.42) (0.42) (0.30) (0.43) (0.00) 
      
Observations 253151 248676 4475 88846 164305 
 
Notes: The Table reports sample means. Standard deviations are presented in parentheses. The subscript i 
indexes firms, and the subscript t, time, where t=1997-2002. FAILit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i 
failed in year t, and 0 otherwise. Groupi is a dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i is part of a group (UK or 
foreign), and 0 otherwise. Profitabilityit is measured as firm i’s profit margin at time t, i.e. the ratio of its 
profits before interests and tax to its total assets. Leverageit is calculated as the firm’s short-term debt to assets 
ratio. Collateralit is given by the ratio of the firm’s tangible assets to its total assets. GEit is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if the firm is globally engaged, and 0 otherwise. EXPORTit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i 
exports at time t, and 0 otherwise; and FOREIGNi is a dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i is foreign-owned, 
and 0 otherwise.  
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 Table 2. Summary statistics: newly established firms 
 
  
Total sample 
 
 
 
(1) 
 
 
Surviving  
firm-years 
 
 
(2) 
 
Failed 
firm-years 
 
 
(3) 
 
Globally 
engaged 
firm-years 
 
(4) 
 
Purely 
domestic 
firm-years 
 
(5) 
 
      
FAILit 0.015 0.00 1.00 0.012 0.018 
 (0.123) (0.00) (0.00) (0.11) (0.13) 
      
Ageit 2.595 2.580 3.515 2.535 2.633 
 (1.49) (1.49) (0.99) (1.51) (1.47) 
Groupi 0.677 0.681 0.395 0.922 0.523 
 (0.47) (0.47) (0.49) (0.27) (0.50) 
Real assetsit 245.389 248.050 76.563 324.729 195.38 
 (1254.88) (1264.01) (293.13) (1413.04) (1141.23 
Log of real assetsit 3.515 3.524 2.932 3.974 3.226 
 (1.73) (1.73) (1.41) (1.68) (1.70) 
Profitabilityit 0.010 0.010 0.020 -0.047 0.046 
 (0.44) (0.44) (0.49) (0.47) (0.43) 
      
Leverageit 0.354 0.354 0.374 0.428 0.308 
 (0.52) (0.51) (0.60) (0.57) (0.47) 
Collateralit 0.296 0.297 0.201 0.241 0.330 
 (0.31) (0.31) (0.23) (0.27) (0.33) 
      
GEit 0.387 0.388 0.291 1.00 0.00 
 (0.49) (0.49) (0.45) (0.00) (0.00) 
EXPORTit 0.298 0.298 0.302 0.626 0.00 
 (0.46) (0.46) (0.46) (0.48) (0.00) 
FOREIGNi 0.309 0.311 0.175 0.865 0.00 
 (0.46) (0.46) (0.38) (0.34) (0.00) 
      
Observations 27900 27467 433 10786 17114 
 
Notes: The Table reports sample means. Standard deviations are presented in parentheses. The subscript i 
indexes firms, and the subscript t, time, where t=1997-2002. Also see Notes to Table 1. 
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Table 3. Financial variables, global engagement, and firms’ survival: full sample 
 
 
  
Pooled Logit 
model 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) 
 
 
Cox 
proportional 
hazard 
model 
 
 
 
(2) 
 
Rare-
events 
Logit 
model 
 
 
 
(3) 
 
Random-
effects Logit 
model 
 
 
 
 
(4) 
 
Pooled Logit 
model 
with time 
dummies 
interacted with 
industry dummies 
 
(5) 
 
Pooled  
Logit model 
 
GEit=EXPDUMit 
 
 
 
(6) 
 
Pooled 
Logit model 
 
GEit=FOREIGNit 
 
 
 
(7) 
 
        
Ageit -0.008***  -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.006*** -0.009*** 
 (0.001)  (0.010) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Groupi -1.248*** -1.181*** -1.247*** -1.248*** -1.250*** -1.325*** -1.160*** 
 (0.04) (0.036) (0.039) (0.037) (0.039) (0.048) (0.040) 
Sizeit -0.075*** -0.128*** -0.075*** -0.075*** -0.077*** -0.094*** -0.071*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.012) 
Profitabilityit -1.265*** -1.180*** -1.265*** -1.265*** -1.267*** -1.386*** -1.284*** 
 (0.066) (0.055) (0.066) (0.060) (0.066) (0.083) (0.066) 
        
Leverageit*(1-GEit) 0.509*** 0.352*** 0.510*** 0.509*** 0.521*** 0.301*** 0.524*** 
 (0.044) (0.040) (0.044) (0.046) (0.045) (0.059) (0.041) 
Leverageit*GEit 0.222*** 0.227*** 0.224*** 0.222*** 0.219*** 0.335*** -0.095 
 (0.056) (0.052) (0.056) (0.057) (0.056) (0.066) (0.090) 
        
Collateralit*(1-GEit) -0.788*** -0.846*** -0.787*** -0.788*** -0.787*** -0.512*** -0.690*** 
 (0.077) (0.074) (0.077) (0.076) (0.077) (0.101) (0.073) 
Collateralit*GEit -0.394*** -0.449*** -0.392*** -0.394*** -0.392*** -0.647*** -0.940*** 
 (0.119) (0.112) (0.112) (0.121) (0.112) (0.163) (0.196) 
        
Observations 253151 253150 253151 253151 252860 132200 252829 
 
Notes: Sizeit represents the logarithm of real assets for firm i at time t. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
In the pooled Logit specifications, the standard errors are corrected for clustering. Time-dummies and industry dummies 
were included in the specifications reported in columns (1) to (4) and (6) to (7). In the specification reported in column 
(5), time dummies are included together with time dummies interacted with industry dummies. Cohort dummies (not 
reported) were included in the Cox proportional hazard specification. Sample period: 1997-2002. * indicates significance 
at the 5% level. ** indicates significance at the 1% level. Also see Notes to Table 1.  
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 Table 4. Financial variables, global engagement, and firms’ survival: newly 
established firms 
 
 
  
Pooled Logit 
model 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) 
 
 
Cox 
proportional 
hazard 
model 
 
 
 
(2) 
 
Rare-
events 
Logit 
model 
 
 
 
(3) 
 
Random-
effects Logit 
model 
 
 
 
 
(4) 
 
Pooled Logit 
model 
with time 
dummies 
interacted with 
industry dummies 
 
(5) 
 
Pooled  
Logit model 
 
GEit=EXPDUMit 
 
 
 
(6) 
 
Pooled 
Logit model 
 
GEit=FOREIGNit 
 
 
 
(7) 
        
Ageit 0.534***  0.532*** 0.749*** 0.532*** 0.517*** 0.533*** 
 (0.040)  (0.040) (0.112) (0.040) (0.052) (0.040) 
Groupi -1.257*** -1.153*** -1.255*** -1.580*** -1.264*** -1.127*** -1.220*** 
 (0.126) (0.115) (0.126) (0.207) (0.126) (0.152) (0.133) 
Sizeit -0.112*** -0.132*** -0.112*** -0.134*** -0.113*** -0.053 -0.108*** 
 (0.036) (0.038) (0.036) (0.047) (0.036) (0.045) (0.036) 
Profitabilityit 0.003 -0.085 -0.0004 0.060 0.007 -0.256** 0.001 
 (0.126) (0.114) (0.126) (0.138) (0.126) (0.126) (0.128) 
        
Leverageit*(1-GEit) 0.330*** 0.282*** 0.342*** 0.459*** 0.332*** 0.270** 0.330*** 
 (0.098) (0.094) (0.098) (0.141) (0.100) (0.122) (0.095) 
Leverageit*GEit 0.0631 0.024 0.087 0.106 0.053 0.082 -0.052 
 (0.165) (0.133) (0.165) (0.163) (0.165) (0.182) (0.232) 
        
Collateralit*(1-GEit) -1.390*** -1.244*** -1.372*** -1.691*** -1.382*** -0.730** -1.251*** 
 (0.266) (0.260) (0.265) (0.355) (0.265) (0.310) (0.253) 
Collateralit*GEit -0.149 0.0832 0.006 -0.018 0.001 -0.182 -0.109 
 (0.341) (0.341) (0.341) (0.422) (0.342) (0.564) (0.409) 
        
Observations 27900 26586 27900 27900 23476 15032 27817 
 
Notes: Sizeit represents the logarithm of real assets for firm i at time t. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
In the pooled Logit specifications, the standard errors are corrected for clustering. Time-dummies and industry dummies 
were included in the specifications reported in columns (1) to (4) and (6) to (7). In the specification reported in column 
(5), time dummies are included together with time dummies interacted with industry dummies. Cohort dummies (not 
reported) were included in the Cox proportional hazard specification. Sample period: 1997-2002. * indicates significance 
at the 5% level. ** indicates significance at the 1% level. Also see Notes to Table 1.  
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 Table A1: Variance-covariance matrix of main variables  
 
 
Panel A: Full sample 
 
  
FAILit 
 
 
Ageit 
 
Groupi 
 
Sizeit 
 
Profita- 
bilityit 
 
Leverage 
ratioit 
 
 
Collateralit 
 
GEit 
FAILit 0.017        
         
Ageit -0.065 416.62       
         
Groupi -0.005 0.108 0.237      
         
Sizeit -0.010 6.891 0.268 2.400     
         
Profitabilityit -0.001 -0.063 -0.007 -0.018 0.041    
         
Leverageit 0.001 -0.547 0.334 0.017 -0.019 0.101   
         
Collateralit -0.001 0.383 -0.014 0.045 -0.003 -0.006 0.079  
         
GEit -0.001 0.102 0.092 0.184 -0.007 0.020 -0.022 0.228 
         
 
 
Panel B: Newly established firms 
 
  
FAILit 
 
 
Ageit 
 
Groupi 
 
Sizeit 
 
Profita- 
bilityit 
 
Leverage 
ratioit 
 
 
Collateralit 
 
GEit 
FAILit 0.015        
         
Ageit 0.014 2.213       
         
Groupi -0.004 -0.029 0.219      
         
Sizeit -0.009 0.151 0.263 3.000     
         
Profitabilityit 0.0001 0.053 -0.022 0.018 2.00    
         
Leverageit 0.0003 -0.023 0.047 -0.076 -0.105 0.268   
         
Collateralit -0.001 -0.008 0.003 0.120 -0.003 -0.008 0.098  
         
GEit -0.001 -0.023 0.095 0.177 -0.022 0.028 -0.021 0.237 
         
 
Notes: The subscript i indexes firms, and the subscript t, time, where t=1997-2002. Sample size in Panel A: 
253151. Sample size in Panel B: 27900. Also see Notes to Tables 1 and 3. 
 
